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LIABILITY OF THE ENTIRE COMMUNITY ESTATE FOR
THE PAYMENT OF STATE INHERITANCE TAX WHERE
HUSBAND UNDERTAKES TO DISPOSE OF ENTIRE COM-

MUNITY ESTATE BY WILL AND WIFE ELECTS TO TAKE
UNDER THE WILL.
The question suggested by this topic has not been passed upon
by the Supreme Court of this state and has already proven troublesome in a good many pending estates. In this paper, the problem
will be discussed from the standpoint of the local inheritance tax
and community property statutes, without any especial attention
to the similar question which arises under the federal estate tax
laws. However, while the state tax and the Federal tax are
undoubtedly fundamentally different in their nature, it is thought
that the solution of the problem as to the state tax will likewise
solve it as to the Federal tax, and that any discussion .of the
problem with reference to one tax is largely applicable to the other.
The importance of this question lies not only in the determination
of the tax in pending estates and in estate of men whose wills have
already been executed, but in its vital bearing upon the attitude of
men of considerable means who will hereafter from time to time
desire to give careful thought to the proper testamentary disposition of their estates. The usual will which undertakes to dispose
of the entire community estate in trust, giving to the wife the
income or the major part of the income during her lifetime, is considered by many men and many lawyers as near an ideal arrangement as can be devised under our present community property statutes in the disposition of larger estates.' Such wills offer the
greatest protection to the estate, and at the same time give to the
widow as nearly an assured income as possible without any of the
responsibility or hazard of caring for the property
It seems remarkable in a way that no adjudication on this point
I On widow's election where husband undertakes to will all of the community property as his own, see Collins v. Collins, 152 Wash. 499, 278 Pac.
186 (1929) In re Williams Estate, 145 Wash. 19, 258 Pac. 851 (1927)
Andrews v. Kelleher 124 Wash. 517, 214 Pac. 1056 (1923) In re Curtis's
Estate, 116 Wash. 237, 199 Pac. 309 (1921) Hermck 'v. Miller, 69 Wash.
256, 125 Pac. 974 (1912). As to time when widow's election is made, and
manner of making, see 40 Cyc. 1974, et seq.
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has yet been secured in this state, and yet the fact is that in most
of the cases where the matter has been presented to the Inheritance Tax Department, the additional tax demanded by that department and by the Internal Revenue Department of the Federal Government has been relatively small and has not justified litigation.
Unquestionably, however, the time will soon arrive when the amount
of the additional tax demanded will justify the interested parties
in going to the expense of securing a decision on the question.
While it is believed that the proper determination of the question lies in a logical application of the fundamental conceptions of
our community property system,2 it is nevertheless interesting and
important, before attempting such an analysis, to refer briefly to
the decisions of courts of other states which have passed upon this
and similar questions.
The cases from common law states bearing upon the somewhat
analogous question of whether a widow, who elects to take under
the will and waive her dower right, which would otherwise be
untaxed, is subject to a tax on the entire estate received are not
harmonious.
In Arkansas8 it was held that under a statute similar to ours,
imposing an inheritance tax upon all property bequeathed under a
will, where the widow accepted and retained the property bequeathed under the will, electing thereby to waive her dower right,
all such property was subject to an inheritance tax since she took
no dower whatever under the circumstances.
The obvious distinction, however, between the widow's dower
right and her right in community property should be noted at this
point. While under our community property system, the widow
undoubtedly has an absolute legal ownership of one-half of the
community estate, it is generally true in common law states that
the legal title to the property is in the husband and that the dower
right of the wife rises to nothing more than an equitable interest
or an expectancy in the estate, which is dependent upon her sur
vivorship.
In Utah it is provided by statute that "one-third of all
real
property possessed by the husband at any time during the marriage
shall be set apart as her property in fee simple if she survives
See for a discussion of the fundamental nature of the community
property system, George Donworth, "Federal Taxation of Community Incomes," 4 Wash. L. Rev. 145 (October, 1929).
1 State v. Lane, 134 Ark. 71, 203 S. W 17 (1918).
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" The statute also provides that if provision is made for
him.
the wife in the will, she must elect whether she will take under the
will or under the statute first referred to.
In a leading Utah case on the subject 4 it appeared that provision
was made for the wife in the will, and she elected to take under the
will. She then claimed that the value of her statutory one-third
interest in the real estate should be deducted from her share under
the will in figuring the inheritance tax. The Supreme Court of
Utah held, however, that by taking under the will, she was in the
same position as any other devisee or legatee and no deduction could
be allowed, and that by taking under the will "she relinquishes
the right given to her by the statute just as effectually as though
she had conveyed such rights by deed either before or after the
and thus whatever share she receives
death of her husband
from her husband's estate under the will passes to her by such will
and not otherwise." This decision was again approved by the
Supreme Court of Utah as late as March, 1920.
Substantially the same conclusion was reached by the Indiana
court in 1925. 6 In that case, the husband devised property in trust
for his wife, with the provision that if she elected to accept the
provisions made for her by law, the provisions of the will would be
ineffectual. She accepted the provisions of the will, and the court
held that the entire estate received by her was subject to an inheritance tax.
7
The rule is the same in New York.

The foregoing are typical of a considerable number of cases from
several common law states on a question which it must be candidly
admitted is very close to the one under consideration. Yet, as
pointed out above, it seems that there is an obvious distinction
between this line of cases and the situation with which we are here
confronted in view of the difference in the character of the wife's
estate prior to the death of the husband.
Some of the common law states, however, have arrived at a different conclusion by a process of reasoning which seems to be much
more logical. Typical of these is a decision of the Supreme Court
of Nebraska.8 In that decision the court said
in re Osgood's Estate, 52 Utah 185, 173 Pac. 152 (1918).
"In re Kohn's Estate, 56 Utah 17, 189 Pac. 409 (1920).
SIn
re Arp's Estate, 83 Ind. App. 371, 147 N. E. 297 (1925).
"In re Stuyvesant's Estate, 131 N. Y. Supp. 197 (1911).
'In re Sanlord's Estate, 91 Neb. 752, 137 N. W 864 (1912).
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"It was contended on the argument of the motion for
a rehearing that the recently adjudicated cases hold that,
notwithstanding the fact that the widow of one who dies
testate takes under the will and thus relinquishes dower,
the value of her dower interest in the lands of which her
husband died seized is not chargeable with an inheritance
tax. In other words, the value of her dower interest should
be deducted from the appraised value of the estate, and the
inheritance tax should be computed on the remainder
thereof. It would seem from a review of the cases decided
since our opinion was adopted, that such is the weight of
authority The reason for the rule seems to be that the
widow takes her dower interest in the estate of her deceased husband by operation of law, that she could not be
deprived of it by his will, that it is something which belongs to her absolutely and independent of any right of
inheritance or succession, and therefore so much of the
estate as belonged to her by right is not chargeable with
an inheritance tax. We are not inclined to place ourselves
in opposition to the weight of authority on this question,
and to this extent our former judgment is modified."
The only decision from a community property state which bears
directly upon the question presented is Texas v. Jones,9 decided
by the Supreme Court of Texas on May 9, 1928. In that case the
husband by his will devised to the wife certain specific property
in lieu of her community interest in the entire estate. The specific
property devised was approximately equal to her undivided half in
the entire community property She elected to take under the
will, and the State of Texas sought to impose a tax on the undivided one-half interest of the husband in the specific property
devised to her. The lower appellate court of the State of Texas,
citing the dower cases which have been referred to above, held that
where a person accepts the benefits under a will, he must adopt the
whole contents of the instrument so far as it concerns him, renouncing every right inconsistent with the will, and that, therefore, an undivided one-half interest in the specific property devised
to the wife must be considered as passing to her by the will so as
to subject that undivided one-half interest to the tax under the
Texas Inheritance Tax Statute, which is almost identical with ours.
The Supreme Court of Texas, however, reversed the decision of the
intermediate appellate court, and in so doing used the following
language
-290 S. W 244, 5 S. W (2nd Series) 972.
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"It cannot be said broadly that the surviving widow has
not taken anything under the will which she would not
otherwise have received, since she has received specific
property under the will, whereas in the absence of the will
she would have owned an undivided one-half interest in
all the property But this is of no moment in the consideration, for we have seen that by the terms of the statute before the tax is imposable the property must have passed
by the will. We are of the opinion no property passed
to the widow by the will in any event. It is undisputed
that all of the estate possessed by the testator was community property As matter of law, the wife was the
equal owner in her own right of one-half of that estate.
To be sure, their estates existed in common, and during
the marriage the common estate was indissoluble, but
nevertheless her right, subject to certain statutory control, was the equal of the husband's. Upon the husband's
death, the community estate passes, one-half to the widow
and one-half to the children (where there are children.
But, while this provision of the law is found in our statutes of descent and distribution, nevertheless the wife's
taking her one-half of the community is not the taking by
an heir. She does not inherit such one-half, but she takes it
as owner in her own separate right after the dissolution of
the marriage. King v. Morris (Tex. Com. App.), 1 S. W
(2d) 605. So that it is plain, if there had been no will,
the surviving widow would not have been taxable for the
one-half of the community which she would have taken,
because the same would not have passed 'by the laws of
descent or distribution.'
"Now, if the surviving widow owned in her own right
an undivided one-half interest in the community property
of herself and husband, then she had title to that extent to
such property, and, if the will of deceased did not pass any
property to her, clearly she is not taxable. The will did
not pass any property whatever to her, because it operated
only as an effective partition of the community property
after death.
"Under the undisputed facts, the surviving widow having received no more than her just share of the community
property fully owned by her prior to the death of her
husband,
she has received no property through the
operation of the will. The only effect of that instrument
was to partition the community property between the surviving widow and the other beneficiaries, in other words,
to make definite the particular portion of the community
property owned by her, and not in anywise to affect, by
increasing or diminishing, her estate. This is not the
passing of property contemplated by the Inheritance Tax
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Act. To impose the tax under such circumstances would
be to visit the tax upon the real owner whose real right
to the property has not been affected one way or the
other by the death of a co-owner."
The State Inheritance Tax Department has relied largely upon
the decision of the intermediate appellate court of Texas in the
Jones case, and it would seem very significant, therefore, that the
Supreme Court of Texas in its recent decision has entirely over
ruled the reasoning of the lower Texas court.
So much for the outside cases. It is sufficient to say that an
investigation of the decisions of other states upon this and closely
analogous questions shows that there is a hopeless conflict in those
decisions. It is submitted, however, that the language used by
the Nebraska court and by the Supreme Court of Texas which
has been referred to is logical and entirely in conformity with
our fundamental notions of the commuity property system, and
that a simple application of these fundamental conceptions demonstrates not only that the state, under our present Inheritance
Tax Statute, is not entitled to a tax upon the wife's share in the
community property, even where she elects to take under the will,
but that an attempt on the part of the state to levy such a tax
raises a serious constitutional question as to its right to do so.
It cannot be seriously contended that the husband has any other
or greater interest in the community property than the wife. They
are equal owners in every respect and the character of their title
to the community property is absolutely identical. The mere fact
that under the statute the husband is made the managing agent
of the community of course does not change in any respect the
wife's equal legal ownership of one-half of the community estate.
The Supreme Courts of Idaho and Nevada (both community
property states) have clearly expressed the character of the wife's
interest in the community property in their decisions, holding
specifically that the wife's half of the community property is not
subject to an inheritance tax upon the death of the husband.
While these cases, of course, are not directly in point, they are
valuable in apprising us of the true character of the community
Before quoting from these cases it is also worth while mentioning that the inheritance tax statutes and the statutes governing the
descent of community property in Idaho and Nevada are practically
identical with ours. In the Idaho case, 10 the court said.
10

Kohny v. Dunbar 21 Idaho 258, 121 Pac. 544 (1912)
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"The foregoing section of the statute recognizes the
husband and wife as equal partners in the community
estate, and it authorizes each to dispose of his or her half
by will. It also provides that the survivor shall continue
to be the owner of half of such property, subject only to
the payment of the community debts. This statute clearly
and unmistakably provides that the surviving spouse take
his or her half of the community property, not by succession, descent, or inheritance, but as survivor of the
marital community or partnership. The same section provides, further, that in the event there be no issue of the
marriage living at the time of the death of one of the
spouses, and he or she leaves no will or testament, the
half of the community property which belonged to the
deceased shall go to the survivor as an heir, and, therefore, by descent and under and by virtue of the 'intestate
laws of this state.' While, therefore, the survivor in this
case receives the entire community estate by reason of the
death of her husband, half of it was already hers, and
the only additional interest or right she acquires in that
half by reason of the death of her husband is the right
of management, control and disposition. The death of the
statutory managing agent and trustee leaves the wife
without such agent, and reduces her to the status of a
feme sole, and the law authorizes her to act in her own
right. Death has worked a dissolution of the community
partnership, and left the surviving partner to act for herself. She also receives the other half of the community
property, but by an entirely different means. It comes
to her likewise by reason of the death of the husband, but
through the means of her heirship. The statute makes
her an heir of her husband, and so, in the absence of testamentary disposition of the husband's share of the community property, she inherits his half, and therefore takes,
is share under the intestate laws of the state. It is clear
however, that she does not inherit her share of the common property "
In the Nevada case,11 the court said.
"It is not necessary to dwell on this principle here,
because, viewing the matter as we do in the light of the
great weight of authority, and especially under statutes
providing for the community system, there is no 'taking
property from another, either by will or legal devolution.'
The property here going to the appellant was property
which she at all times under our statutory provision 'held
"In re Williams, 40 Nev. 241, 161 Pac. 741 (1916).
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in common with her husband.'
Hence there was no
privilege to be taxed, but rather a 'right' in property
recognized by statutory prescription 'held' by her at all
times 'in common with her husband.' The death of the
husband only dissolved the community, and released that
which she held from the statutory dominance of her deceased spouse."
Mr. Ross, in his work on Inheritance Taxation, 12 makes the following statement in reference to the liability of the wife's share
of the community property to an inheritance tax.
"The legislature, in adopting the community system,
intended to provide a real marital community in property
and accord to the wife a fuller measure of property rights
than was hers under the common law The legislature
did not suppose it was providing her a mere expectancy
during the husband's life and an inheritance on his death.
That would be far from what is contemplated in the very
nature of community property And certainly, m adopting the inheritance system of taxation, the legislature did
not have in mind the exaction of tribute from the community interest of a wife upon the death of her husband. In his lifetime such interest is her own property,
practically in the fullest sense, except that the law constitutes him the agent for its control and management,
and the removal of the agent by death in no wise works a
transmission of title to be subjected to the succession
tax. "
From the foregoing it clearly appears that upon the death of the
husband the wife does not take her half of the community property
by inheritance, but that she simply retains what she already owns,
and, this being so, it is beyond the power of the state as a general
rule to levy an inheritance tax upon her half of the community
property At this point we should also remember that under the
statute the husband has absolutely no right to make any testamentary disposition of the wife's half of the community property,
for the obvious reason that it is hers and not his to dispose of.
Now, upon the death of the husband, either with a will or without a will, the wife is still the absolute owner of one-half of the
community property, and nothing that the husband can do or say
in his will can change that situation or can in any way affect
this absolute ownership of the wife.
Ross, Inheritance Taxation, p. 84.
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Bearing in mind that the death of the decedent is the time that
the rights of all parties, including the rights of the commonwealth
to tax, are determined, 3 it seems that we have now arrived, by the
simple application of elementary principles, at the correct solution
of the problem. For it is manifest that at the time of the death
of the husband, under a will such as we are here discussing, the
state is in no position to levy any tax whatever upon the wife's half
of the community property
Before the state can plausibly make such an attempt, a further
voluntary and affirmative action on the part of the wife is required.
In other words, she must agree and consent, either by a formal written acceptance of the will and relinquishment of her interest in
the community property, or by virtue of an estoppel, that her
half of the community property shall, along with the husband's
half, be turned into the trust.14 But this amounts to nothing more
than a conveyance by the wife to the trustee, after the death of the
husband, of her interest in the community property The fact that
the entire community property finds its way into the trust does not
mean that the trustee or the beneficiaries under the trust receive
the property by will or inheritance, it simply means that one-half
of the community property goes to the trustee for the benefit of the
named beneficiaries by virtue of the will of the husband, and the
other half of the community property goes into the trust because
of the voluntary and, what clearly seems to be, the legally affirmative act of the wife.
Our statute' 5 levies an inheritance tax upon "all property
which shall pass by will or by the statutes of inheritances of this or
any other state.
" To say that the wife's half of the community
property passes to the trustee "by will" is to do violence to every
fundamental principle of community property law.
Other broad principles of law support this conclusion, for it is
accepted law in this state that an inheritance tax is a tax on the
right to inherit, 6 or, as otherwise expressed, a tax on the privilege
of succeeding to the inheritance or of becoming a beneficiary under
a will. '1 Again, it is unquestionably the law that an inheritance
tax is not applicable where the property or interest there passes
"Kingsbury v. Chapin, 196 Mass. 533, 82 N. E. 700 (1907) Oldt Colony
Trust Co. v. Treasurer, 238 Mass. 544, 131 N. E. 321 (1921).
11See footnote 1, supra.
25Rem. Comp. Stat. sec 11201, P. C. sec. 7051.
"'Inre Corbz's Estate, 107 Wash. 424, 181 Pac. 910 (1919).
1,Cooley, on Taxation, paragraph 1721.
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independently of the death of the decedent. 18 And even though the
transmission of property depends upon the death of the decedent,
it is not within the descriptive words of the statute where it passes
from an outside source rather than from the decedent. 9
Moreover, our own Supreme Court, in passing upon the validity
of the inheritance tax statute, says that the right to levy such a
tax depends upon the state's plenary power to direct the disposition of the property of decedents, the right of the owner of property
to make testamentary disposition of the same not being a natural
right which follows from mere ownership, and. therefore, the state
being permitted to take the whole of a man's estate upon his death,
it may, if it chooses, take any part less than the whole.' 0 But if it
be contended that the state has the right to tax the wife's half of the
community property, even where she takes under the will, it would
seem that the state is undertaking to levy an inheritance tax on
property which was not at all owned by the decedent, and thus a
serious constitutional question arises. Consequently any attempt
to levy such a tax on the wife's share, even though she takes under
the will, is not only to disrupt our well-settled ideas of the community property system, but, beyond that, appears to run counter
to other broader and well recognized principles of law.
JuDsox F FALKNOR.'

"Dexter v. Treasurer 243 Mass. 523, 137 N. . 877 (1923).
1 Tyler v. Treasurer 226 Mass. 306, 115 N. E. 300 (1917)
"In re Sherwood's Estate, 122 Wash. 648, 211 Pac. 734 (1922).
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